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Note, Comparison: Japanese and American Plant Closing Laws
Allison Zousmer*
You tell us plant closing legislation is anticompetitive. But every major
country besides our own has an advance notice law. Our two most in-
tense competitors, Japan and Germany, treat their workers better than
we do.
Representative Dan Rostenkowski'
I am convinced this bill will cost jobs and damage our economic growth.
President Ronald Reagan
2
[T]he fact that Japan has such a broad regulation has not impaired its
international competitiveness because the Japanese have built into their




In August, 1988, Congress passed the United States' first compre-
hensive plant closing law: the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Act ("WARN"). 4 Throughout the debates, opponents of the law
feared that the new law would compromise our already tenuous com-
petitive position in the international economy. They warned that such
legislation would destroy the ability of American business to compete
with foreign companies, especially those of our chief economic rival,
Japan. For proponents of the law, discussion of the Japanese economy
served a different purpose. It provided a model of a society where
plant closing laws coexist with economic growth.
This successful coexistence seems ironic, since Japan modeled its
labor law system after American laws. During the post-World War II
occupation, the Allied Command required the Japanese to submit all
drafts of potential legislation to them for approval.5 As a result of this
process of Japanese drafting and American amending, Japan became
the first industrial country outside America to adopt an unfair labor
practice system. 6 Japan also passed labor laws mirroring their Ameri-
can counterparts: guaranteeing the right of unions to organize and act
collectively, 7 requiring employers to bargain collectively with worker
* University of Michigan Law School, Class of 1990.
1. 134 CONG. REC. H3550 (daily ed. May 24, 1988) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski).
2. Id. at H3531 (statement of President Reagan).
3. Id. at S8866 (daily ed. July 6, 1988) (statement of Sen. Matsunaga).
4. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 89 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109).
5. W. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 18 (1984).
6. Id. at 42.
7. Id. at 30.
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representatives, 8 establishing an administrative agency to interpret la-
bor laws,9 providing for union security agreements,' 0 and prohibiting
public employees from striking."I
In implementing the new laws, Japan benefitted from the lessons
America had learned from the evolution of our labor laws. For exam-
ple, they included in the statutes prohibitions against yellow dog con-
tracts, which the U.S. Supreme Court had protected until the 1930s.1
2
As part of the Allied plan to promote democracy in postwar Japan,
General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers, also encouraged the development of labor unions through dis-
cussions with Japanese leaders and official memoranda. ' 3 Thus, the
postwar occupation forced the Japanese to adopt labor laws largely
paralleling those in America.
With the passage of WARN, however, America appears to be re-
versing the prior trend by modeling its laws after the Japanese exam-
ple. WARN guarantees to American workers the same rights that the
Japanese plant closing law, articles 19-21 of the Labour Standards
Act, have guaranteed to Japanese employees since 1947. Like the Jap-
anese law, WARN focuses on providing workers with advance notice
of mass layoffs and plant closings.' 4 Since the Japanese law operates
within a similar legal framework, in a country which shares our goals
of economic growth and development, comparing the Japanese act
with the new American law offers insight into the potential impact and
operation of the new American act. Differences in the Japanese ap-
proach to law and social behavior, however, may limit the validity of
such comparisons.
Prior to World War II, giri, an informal and personal set of social
rules, dictated Japanese behavior.15 Although very similar laws gov-
ern Japanese society, the Japanese system of social customs overrides
the written law, and therefore restricts the effect such laws actually
have. As a result of these differences, Americans cannot transplant
successful Japanese labor laws to our society and expect the same opti-
mistic results. Japanese labor relations, however, do provide a model
for America by proving that, through cooperation and creativity, busi-
ness and labor can work together to increase productivity. Expecting
the Japanese to supply specific answers to industrial problems, how-
8. Id. at 39.
9. Id. at 42.
10. Id. at 37.
11. Id. at 43.
12. Duff, Japanese and American Labor Law. Structural Similarities and Substantive Differ-
ences, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 629, 631 (1984).
13. W. GOULD, supra note 5, at 18.
14. Labour Standards Act, arts. 19-21 (1947).
15. Duff, supra note 12, at 631.
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ever, can only lead to disillusionment in an American society
grounded in different values and traditions.
This Note analyzes the American and Japanese approaches to
plant closings and discusses to what extent the American government
can apply the successful Japanese approach to its own labor relations
system. The first part examines the specific provisions of the two na-
tions' laws. Second, it illustrates how the divergent social rules and
historical backgrounds influence the operation of the plant closing
laws in both nations. Part three explores the impact and applicability
of Japanese labor policies to American industrial practices. The Note
concludes that although the Japanese provide a general model for a
labor management system which combines cooperation and economic
development, cultural and historical differences prevent a transplanted




The Labour Standards Act of 1947 was part of the Allied postwar
legislation imposed upon the new Japanese government. ' 6 Articles 19-
21 of the Act require Japanese companies to give thirty days advance
notice of plant closings and mass layoffs to workers whenever person-
nel cuts cannot be attributed to worker conduct.' 7 This includes the
discharge of even a single employee. If a company fails to give all
"permanent workers" this protection, the law requires payment of
wages for each day without notice.' 8 The definition of permanent
workers under article 21 excludes those employed on a day-to-day ba-
sis, those employed for less than two months, seasonal workers em-
ployed for less than four months, and workers on probation. The
practical impact of excluding temporary workers means that eighty
per cent of the workforce falls outside of the Act.' 9 The law lifts re-
strictions upon discharge "where it has become impossible to continue
a business on account of natural disaster, emergency or other unavoid-
able reason."' 20 An employer can also avoid the notice requirement by
16. Since the Americans enacted plant closing laws in 1988 and the Europeans in the late
1960s, the Japanese probably proposed this law and the Allies approved it.
17. Labour Standards Act, supra note 14.
18. Id.
19. Id. Part-time employees are a subset, not synonymous with temporary employees. Tem-
porary employment is a form of "second class" employment in contrast with the privileged status
of permanent employment. Permanent employment is limited to men, and usually only exists in
large corporations. Note, Worker Participation In Japan: The Temporary Employee and Enter-
prise Unionism, 7 COMP. LAB. L. 365, 374 (1986).
20. 6 Z. KITAGAWA, DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 1.03(10)(b)(ii) (1987).
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paying employees daily wages for the thirty day period in lieu of noti-
fying them. The Japanese law does not contain damage provisions.
The American Law
Like the Japanese law, WARN requires employers to give advance
notice to employees before mass layoffs or plant closings. WARN fol-
lows the Japanese example of excluding temporary or part-time em-
ployees. The definition of part-time employee includes those workers
employed for less than six of the twelve months immediately preceding
the dismissal, or working less than an average of twenty hours per
week.
2 1
Both acts also contain similar exceptions to their coverage for inev-
itable economic or natural catastrophes. Exceptions exist for closings
caused by unforeseeable business circumstances and "natural disas-
ters, such as flood, earthquake, or drought. ' 22 Under the faltering
companies exception, an employer may reduce the notification period
if, at the time mandated for notification, he was seeking capital which
he believed would have postponed or averted the shutdown. The Act
excuses the employer from the duty to notify in these circumstances if
doing so would have jeopardized his effort to save the business. 23 Fi-
nally, WARN exempts from the notification requirement layoffs in-
volving a strike or lockout not intended to violate the Act and closings
or layoffs resulting from the completion of a temporary project, when
the workers knew at the time of hiring that the work would be tempo-
rary.24 Although falling within an exclusion relieves the company of
the sixty day notice requirement, WARN demands that an employer
still give "as much notice as is practicable," as well as a brief statement
of the basis for reducing the notification period.
25
Courts may order employers violating WARN to pay displaced
workers lost wages, and the local community a maximum of $500, for
each day the employer failed to notify within the statutory sixty day
period.26 WARN authorizes a court to decrease these damages "in its
discretion" if an employer proves that it acted in good faith, and had
"reasonable grounds" to believe that it had not violated the Act.27
Although Japanese employers have the option of paying wages in lieu
of giving notice, both alternatives satisfy the goal of fair treatment and
compensation.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(8) (1982).
22. Id. § 2102(b)(2)(b).
23. Id. § 2102(b).
24. Id. § 2103(1,2).
25. Id. § 2102(b)(3). Since WARN became effective on February 4, 1989, the courts have not
yet had an opportunity to interpret how much notice is "practicable."
26, Id. § 2104.
27. Id. § 2104(a)(4).
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Despite the major similarities between the two acts, three substan-
tive differences between the two laws also exist: the definition of per-
sonnel cuts, the definition of employees, and the scope of notification.
For instance, the Japanese law encompasses all personnel cuts, includ-
ing the dismissal of a single employee, for which worker conduct does
not cause the dismissal, aside from cases falling under the exceptions
for unforesseable natural or economic catastrophe. WARN applica-
tion, however, depends on the size of the company and the number of
employees losing their jobs.
WARN only covers businesses employing 100 or more employees
(excluding part-time employees) or those employing 100 or more em-
ployees working at least 4,000 hours per week in the aggregate.28 The
law limits the definition of "plant closings" to situations where at least
fifty or more employees lose their positions within a thirty day period,
and where a "single site of employment, or one or more facilities or
operating units within a single site of employment" closes down tem-
porarily or permanently. 29 A "mass layoff" occurs only when a com-
pany dismisses at least one third of the workers at a single site, causing
at least fifty employees to lose their jobs, or when 500 employees at a
particular site lose their jobs.
30
The second way in which the application of the two laws differs
arises from the divergent categories of employees covered by the Act.
WARN simply excludes part-time and recently hired employees. The
Japanese concept of temporary workers, a set of second class citizens
which includes women, employees of small firms, and certain types of
jobs, excludes eighty per cent of the workforce from the law's protec-
tion.31 Workers considered "temporary" employees in Japanese soci-
ety do not change this classification by years of service since the
categories depend more on the type of position and employer than on
years of employment. This represents a substantial contrast to the
American approach which only excludes employees who have worked
comparatively few hours for the company. In many circumstances,
however, Japanese employers treat temporary employees just as they
do permanent workers, despite the exclusion of temporary workers
from the Act.
Third, the American law requires employers to provide notice to
affected unions or non-unionized employees, the state "dislocated
worker unit," and the chief elected official of the community where the
closing or layoff occurs. 32 These requirements reflect the American
experience with actual plant closings and their potential impact on the
28. Id. § 2101(a)(1).
29. Id. § 2101(a)(2).
30. Id. § 2101(a)(3).
31. Note, supra note 19, at 374.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1982).
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community. The Japanese law does not require notice to the corre-
sponding government agencies. The administration of the Act, which
mandates that the District Labour Standards Bureau certify the clos-
ing, ensures that the government is informed of and involved in the
closing.
Both laws differ from their European and Canadian counterparts,
which require more comprehensive and coordinated training and job
placement.3 3 Unlike the European and Canadian approaches, which
involve extensive coordination and government involvement, Japanese
and American laws reflect a more laissez-faire approach to plant clos-
ings. Despite differences in the two laws, they share the same scope
and the same limited purpose of notifying workers before job displace-
ment. The Japanese enforcement of the Labour Standards Act, how-
ever, requiring government involvement in the decision to close the




Although the Labour Standards Act only requires employers to
notify workers thirty days before layoffs or plant closings, Japanese
judicial decisions place further limits on management. Before shutting
down operations, the Chief of the District Labour Standards Inspec-
tion Bureau must certify the discharge or closing.34 To obtain certifi-
cation, the company must prove that it made personnel cuts only as a
last resort, that it used fair criteria in determining which employees to
dismiss, and that it complied with any collective agreements regarding
union consultation or consent. 35 Courts hold discharges which do not
conform to these standards void.36 Although a discharge may remain
valid if the court determines that "just cause" existed, a company that
fails to obtain certification may be subject to criminal penalties.37
Japanese courts impose such restrictions on employers, despite the
33. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FOREIGN EXPERIENCE OF THE TASK FORCE ON ECO-
NOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND WORKER DISLOCATION, SECRETARY OF LABOR'S TASK FORCE ON
ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND WORKER DISLOCATION IN A COMPETITIVE SOCIETY (1986)
(hereinafter FOREIGN SUBCOMMITTEE).
34. According to Kitagawa, courts authorize plant closings only when the employer can
prove that they were used as a last resort:
Many courts venture to inquire critically whether personnel cuts were necessary, and there
are many decisions which refuse to recognize that personnel cuts were necessary where it
was found that the employer failed to make personnel cuts as a last resort, only after all
efforts to avoid the same had been of no avail.
KITAGAWA, supra note 20, at § 1.03(10)(d)(i).
35. Id. § 1.03(10)(d)(i-iii).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 1.03(10)(b)(ii).
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law's silence, because of Japanese social rules and expectations.
Before World War II, feudalistic social rules (giri) directed Japanese
behavior. 38 These rules, centuries old, continue to influence the Japa-
nese in both personal and business relations. "It is well known that
age-old paternalistic ideas color both the conduct of business firms and
the practical operation of trade unionism in Japan. ' 39 Because of the
homogeneous nature of Japanese society, the traditional social rules
are familiar to all, and continue to affect behavior and attitudes even
more than the written law.
40
Professor Hanami, a leading Japanese legal scholar, believes that
these customs determine judicial decisions even where they contradict
the written law. Hanami explains that "[i]n labour law, custom is es-
pecially important because many of the theories and some of the de-
cided cases admit that collective agreements can be made without
writing, in spite of the provisions in the Trade Union Law requiring
the written form."' 4' Japanese judges do not stress stare decisis so
much as finding workable solutions to problems, which often means
following custom as opposed to law.
42
Japanese society emphasizes cooperation. Because informal rules
play such a large role in their society, the Japanese do not stress indi-
vidual legal rights and do not rely on the law to settle disputes. 43 In-
stead, parties expect to work internally to resolve their differences.
44
As Noda explains:
Japanese generally conceive of law as an instrument of constraint that
the state uses when it wishes to impose its will. Law is thus synonymous
with pain or penalty. To an honorable Japanese, the law is something
that is undesirable, even detestable, something to keep as far away from
as possible. . . To take someone to court to guarantee the protection of
one's own interests, or to be mentioned in court is a shameful thing...
In a word, Japanese do not like law.4
5
Overt conflict, such as litigation, will be avoided in Japanese society,
which focuses on cooperation and consensus.
The institutional framework of enterprise unionism reinforces this
cooperative attitude. Because unions organize within companies
rather than within general trades,46 a close association develops be-
38. Duff, supra note 12, at 631.
39. Id. at 630.
40. Id. at 631.
41. Id. at 632.
42. Id.
43. Special Project Note, Alternatives to the United States' System of Labor Relations: A Com-
parative Analysis of Labor Relations Systems in the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and
Sweden, 41 VAND. L. REV. 627, 644 (1988) [hereinafter Special Project Note].
44. Id.
45. Duff, supra note 12, at 637.
46. In Japan, 90% of unions are enterprise, as opposed to industrial or trade unions. These
unions represent 33% of the workforce. Note, supra note 19, at 378.
Michigan Journal of International Law
tween the union and company leadership. For example, unions have
access to meeting rooms, phones, and offices within the plant, and em-
ployees serving as union officials remain on the payroll if their union
duties do not require their full time attention. 47 Moreover, mecha-
nisms for joint consultation (roshikyogiseido) exist within most large
plants.4 8 The roshikyogiseido allows for informal behind-the-scenes
discussions of important business decisions, including plant closings
and the available alternatives.
49
The close association of enterprise unions and management also
affects the demands unions make and the means they resort to. As the
existence of the union and the continuation of employment depend
solely on the success of the company, enterprise unions must consider
the financial position of their employer in shaping their demands and
strategies.50 As a result, unions in Japan tend to use small strikes to
harass and communicate, but because of their own stake in the com-
pany's productivity, will seldom engage in strikes designed to damage
the enterprise. Japanese react strongly to shame; unions hope that the
embarrassment of strikes will bring the necessary results without caus-
ing economic harm.5'
The paternalistic and feudalistic nature of the giri also affect the
substance of labor institutions and norms. Like feudal lords, Japanese
employers feel a paternalistic obligation to provide their employees
with much more than wages.
The Japanese see each individual as having economic, social, psychologi-
cal and spiritual needs, much as we do when we step back and think
about it. But Japanese executives assume it is their task to attend to
much more of the whole person, and not leave so much to other institu-
tions (such as the government, family or religious ones). And they be-
lieve it is only when individuals' needs are well met within the subculture
of a corporation that they can largely be freed for productive work that
is in larger part outstanding. 52
Reflecting this belief, Japanese firms offer their workers "a sense of
belonging, personal support, welfare and retirement benefits, and in-
creased salary with rank and age."'53
This paternalism led to the development of the institutions of per-
manent employment and seniority wages. Fifteen to twenty-five per
cent of the firms, usually large corporations, offer lifetime employment
47. Id. at 380-81.
48. W. GOULD, supra note 5, at 12.
49. Id.
50. T. HANAMI, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 49 (1979), re-
printed in Duff, supra note 12, at 634.
51. Duff, supra note 12, at 635-36.
52. R. PASCALE & A. ATHOS, THE ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT 132 (1981).
53. E. VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE 137 (1979).
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security (shushin koyo). 54 Those qualifying for permanent employ-
ment join a company upon graduating from school and remain until
they retire; in return, the employer promotes security through internal
training and seniority-based bonuses (nenko), which vary with the fi-
nancial success of the firm. 55 Since only permanent employees may
join enterprise unions, collective bargaining agreements sacrifice the
interests of temporary employees to guarantee permanent employees'
continued security through immunity from dismissals and transfers.
56
Due to the cooperative and paternalistic nature of Japanese indus-
trial relations, Japanese management strives to avoid discharges. This
policy reflects the obligation management feels under the permanent
employment system. Since the permanent employment system im-
pedes the ability of discharged employees to find new jobs, and since
those who succeed in locating new jobs often lose the benefits of their
seniority-based wages, discharges result in severe consequences. In
addition to paternal concern and obligations, the shame of discharging
employees also motivates Japanese employers to find alternatives. Fi-
nally, a strong national spirit drives employers to avoid discharges
since increased unemployment could harm the entire economy.
Before Japanese executives shut down plant operations, they ex-
plore alternatives. Preferable means of preserving a company's opera-
tions include: developing a new product line, decreasing or
eliminating the number hired each year directly from the universities,
imposing minor salary cuts for workers and large cuts for supervisors,
decreasing working hours and/or bonuses, pressuring older workers to
retire early (katatataki), transferring employees to subsidiaries or sub-
contractors (shukko), and closing the plant for a few days each month
while paying employees 90-95% of their regular salaries (kikyu).17
Although Japanese industries implement all of these strategies, com-
panies frequently choose to adjust the level of employment within a
firm by intra and inter company transfers and retraining programs
supported by government assistance.18 Through these mechanisms
and a social structure stressing cooperation and paternalism, the Japa-
nese avoid the large number of plant closings and layoffs which plague
the American economy.
59
54. FOREIGN SUBCOMMIrrEE, supra note 33, at 3.
55. Note, supra note 19, at 366.
56. Id. at 374.
57. VOGEL, supra note 53, at 139.
58. FOREIGN SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 33, at 4.
59. Although the Japanese rarely close plants, Americans have not been as successful in
avoiding operation shutdowns. Between 1981 and 1986, plant closings and layoffs eliminated
the jobs of 10.8 million Americans. TASK FORCE ON ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND WORKER
DISLOCATION, SECRETARY OF LABOR'S TASK FORCE ON ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND
WORKER DISLOCATION IN A COMPETITIVE SOCIETY 3 (1986)
Michigan Journal of International Law
American Society
Just as America influenced the development of Japanese labor law,
foreign examples, particularly English law, also influenced American
labor law. 60 Traditionally, the English based their statutes and com-
mon law on the master-servant relationship. 61 Under English law, and
subsequently under American law, courts presumed a one year em-
ployment contract, unless evidence proved that the parties intended
otherwise. 62 As English employment relations shifted to the commer-
cial setting, the law extended further protection to workers by impos-
ing notice requirements on masters who wished to terminate
servants. 63 At the same time, English attitudes also curtailed the
growth of unions in America. The one year presumption of a contract
had formerly provided workers with the necessary job security so that
unions were not necessary. With the disappearance of the one year
presumption, a great imbalance in the worker-employee relation devel-
oped. The roots of American management's adversity to unionization
dates back to the English, who condemned the concerted activities of
workers as "criminal conspiracies.
' '64
In the late 1800s, however, American law departed from English
precedent with the evolution of the employment-at-will doctrine.
65
This doctrine gave both employers and employees the right to end the
employment relationship at any time. This development, which dis-
criminated in practice against the employee class, can be explained by
changes in American social and industrial conditions. Industrializa-
tion and urbanization impersonalized the traditional master-servant
relationship. Many employers no longer felt obligated to guarantee
their employees job security. 66 The employment-at-will doctrine facil-
itated industrialization and maximized profit by allowing businessmen
more flexibility to discharge workers in response to the changing econ-
omy. 67 A surplus of labor, due to the increasing population, also al-
lowed employers the freedom to discharge and rehire quickly. The
employment-at-will doctrine formed the basis of employment rela-
tions, resulting in diminished job security for American workers and
increased employer control over employees.
Management retained absolute termination authority in American




63. Id. at 4.
64. R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, T. ST. ANTOINE, & C. CARVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 3
(7th ed. 1979).
65. Millspaugh, supra note 60, at 4.
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id. at 6.
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labor law until the passage of the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") in 1935.6 8 The NLRA, in an effort to promote industrial
peace and economic stability, sought worker-management interaction
and the protection of employees. It guaranteed the right of self-organ-
ization, provided mechanisms for workers to negotiate with manage-
ment, legitimized union security clauses, and instituted grievance
procedures. The NLRA, in setting up these procedures, established an
adversarial system so that workers' rights could not be co-opted by
strong management.
The substantive provisions of the NLRA guaranteed workers the
right to act collectively and obligated management to bargain with
employees on certain subjects. The Act restricted the right of employ-
ers to terminate workers by prohibiting employers from discharging
workers who exercised these statutory rights. 69 The Supreme Court
repeatedly affirmed, however, that the NLRA did not affect manage-
ment's prerogative to close plants since this constituted an internal
economic decision. 70 As Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority in
the landmark case, First National Maintenance:
[T]he harm likely to be done to an employer's need to operate freely in
deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for economic
reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained through
the union's participation in making the decision, and we hold that the
decision itself is not part of. . . "terms and conditions". . . over which
Congress has mandated bargaining.
71
First National Maintenance held that the NLRA did not impose on
management the duty to bargain over whether to close a plant. Un-
ions, left out of the decision to close the plant, responded by increasing
their role in plant closing decisions through contract negotiations re-
garding the "effects" of shut downs in terms of benefits and advance
notice.
Limitations on management termination authority also came from
the states. State courts used themes such as specific considerations of
state or local public policy, an implied contract theory of wrongful
discharge, and an implied employer covenant of fair dealing or good
faith to restrict employer discharge decisions.72 In addition, the legis-
latures of eight states enacted plant closing laws. 73 Although these
68. Nat'l Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), [hereinafter NLRA] (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982)).
69. NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982).
70. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 66 (1981); NLRB v. Darlington
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
71. First National Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981).
72. Millspaugh, supra note 60, at 8.
73. Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, South Carolina, Tenessee and Wis-
consin have enacted plant closing laws. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, PLANT CLOSINGS: THE
COMPLETE RESOURCE GUIDE 7 (1988).
Michigan Journal of International Law
laws varied in their language and in their specific provisions, all shared
a new common purpose of greater government involvement to pro-
mote fairness in the workplace. The willingness of only eight states to
enact such laws, however, diminished their impact.
On the national level, Senator Walter Mondale (D-Minn.) and
Congressman William Ford (D-Mich.) first proposed comprehensive
plant closing legislation as part of the Trade Act of 1974. Congress
continued to consider and reject such legislation on an almost annual
basis. In 1985, Secretary of Labor William Brock appointed the Task
Force on Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation. This Task
Force recommended, almost unanimously, the adoption of expanded
programs for dislocated workers and specifically endorsed advance no-
tification of plant closings. Soon after the issuance of the Brock Re-
port, Congress defeated H.R. 1616, which would have required
advance notification and consultation before closing plants, by a vote
of 208-203, the closest vote yet. 74
After years of active debate, Congress finally enacted plant closing
legislation in August, 1988. The Senate approved WARN the same
day Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.) introduced it as
a free standing bill, by a vote of 72-23. 75 WARN subsequently passed
the House by a vote of 286-136,76 signalling overwhelming support for
the bill. On August 4, 1988, WARN became law.
Not even the recent passage of WARN, however, demonstrates a
complete reversal of the American laissez-faire attitude. The Act took
eighteen months to become law. The August enactment came only
after President Reagan vetoed the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act (H.R. 3) because of its inclusion of plant closing provisions. 77
In his veto message, the President pleaded with Congress to adopt "la-
bor laws that fit the flexible, fast-paced economy of the 1990s, not re-
strictive leftovers from the 1930s agenda. ' '78
Business leaders also opposed the law as an unwarranted and un-
necessary interference with their freedom to operate.
Unions are interested in raising wages and fringe benefits for their mem-
bers. They know, however, that their ability to do this is restricted by
the threat of firms moving to new locations. If business is prevented
from moving, the immediate threat of job loss is taken away, and, as a
consequence, unions can be expected to increase their demands on
74. H.R. 1616, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 32, 917-40 (1985).
75. 134 Cong. Rec. S8868 (daily ed. July 6, 1988).
76. 134 Cong. Rec. H550-20 (daily ed. July 13, 1988).
77. H.R. Doc. No. 100-200, 100 Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H3531 (daily ed. May 24,
1988).
78. 134 CONG. REC. H3532 (daily ed. May 24, 1988) (text of veto message by President
Reagan).
[Vol. 10:957
Summer 1989] Note, Japanese and American Plant Closing Laws 969
employers.
79
The purpose of these bills is to give politicians and unions property
rights in the existing distribution of jobs and business activity. And the
exercise of these rights would prevent businesses from moving to more
profitable and productive locations. Instead, the firms' assets are kept in
place where they can be pillaged by the feather-bedding and antiquated
work rules of union shops and forced to pay the bills run up by vote-
buying politicians.
80
These attitudes reflect the traditionally adverse relations of labor and
management in American labor relations. These widespread and
heartfelt beliefs will not quickly be abandoned in favor of the coopera-
tive Japanese approach simply by changing our laws to resemble those
in Japan.
APPLICABILITY OF JAPANESE PRINCIPLES TO AMERICAN LAW
More important than the similarities between the American and
Japanese plant closing laws are the divergent histories and social val-
ues influencing them. The Japanese Labour Standards Act, formu-
lated as industrialization began in Japan, embodies a traditionally
paternalistic and cooperative attitude towards labor-management rela-
tions. Moreover, a completely different institutional structure of en-
terprise unions, permanent employment, enterprise internalization of
difficulties, and active government support of economic development
underlies this law. WARN, on the other hand, represents a normative
approach to industrial relations. Unlike the Japanese law, the Ameri-
can law drastically departs from the existing norms and historical atti-
tudes. After over a century of complete management autonomy to
shutdown operations and layoff workers, WARN authorizes the gov-
ernment to intervene in internal corporate policy. Furthermore, in a
system characterized by adversarial relations, the passage of WARN,
over the vocal objections of industry, represents a victory for the
workers over management. However, this whole attitude contradicts
the underlying premise of the Japanese act: humane industrial policies
to promote productivity and prosperity for both management and
labor.
WARN, in some ways, signifies a movement towards the Japanese
approach of cooperative relations and emphasis on employee well-be-
ing. Like the Japanese, American officials also appear to recognize
that good relations with employees may breed higher productivity for
management. For example, then-Senator Dan Quayle (R-Ind.) com-
mented that "[y]ou cannot operate a good business, be productive and
competitive in this competitive world if you are going to have that
79. Aaron, Plant Closings: American and Comparative Perspectives, 59 CHI. KENT L. REV.
941, 962 (1983), quoting R. MCKENZIE, RESTRICTIONS ON BUSINESS MOBILITY 57 (1979).
80. Id., quoting Words and Deeds, The Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1979, at 20.
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adversarial relationship."' 8 1 Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd
echoed this sentiment. "America must change the way it has been
doing business. One of the fundamental changes must be in the way
management and labor confront each other at the negotiation table.
Management and labor must forge a new relationship if America is to
compete against our foreign competition. ' 82 Such an approach dem-
onstrates a rejection of adversarial relations, since both employers and
employees benefit from changing their relations.
The legislative history of the bill also indicates a concern with em-
ployee protection not previously exhibited in labor issues. For exam-
ple, the bill's sponsor, Representative William Ford (D-Mich.), argued
for the legislation on the basis of its impact on the individual em-
ployee. "People need time to look for new jobs; they need time to put
their family finances in order; they need time to find a training pro-
gram that will qualify them for a good job."' 83 Representative James
Oberstar (D-Minn.) supported the Act on the grounds that "fairness
dictates that industry owes at least 60 days to workers who have given
10, 20, 30 loyal years to their jobs."'84 Representative William Clay
(D-Miss.) justified imposing notice requirements because of the impact
such notice would have on "alleviating . . .unnecessary suffering to
individuals and communities. '8 5 With a background of laissez-faire
capitalism and adversarial industrial relations, justifying labor legisla-
tion on grounds of employee well-being and fairness marks a substan-
tial change in attitude. More remarkable, though, is the prevalence of
this attitude: 72 Senators, 286 Representatives, and 86% of the popu-
lation supported the bill.
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Changes in attitudes towards work and industry in general may
reveal that the discussions on the floor were more than mere rhetoric.
For example, complete management termination authority conflicts
with the shifting conception of job security as a property, not a con-
tractual right.8 7 In his seminal work Ownership of Jobs.- A Compara-
tive Study, Professor Frederic Meyers explained how this shift may
affect plant closing attitudes. "A job, of course, is an abstraction, but
like other abstractions such as 'good will' and 'expectancy of profit,' it
may become the object of 'ownership.' Acceptance of the idea of job
ownership then raises the issue of the consequences of involuntary
deprivation of title."' 88 Viewing employment as a property right recog-
81. 134 CONG. REC. S8379 (daily ed. June 22, 1988) (statement of Sen. Quayle).
82. Id. at S8374 (statement of Sen. Byrd).
83. Id. at H3536 (daily ed. May 24, 1988) (statement of Rep. Ford).
84. Id. at H3540 (statement of Rep. Oberstar).
85. Id. (statement of Rep. Clay).
86. Matlack, Forewarning, 1988 NAT'L J. 1534, 1535.
87. Millspaugh, supra note 60, at 34.
88. Aaron, supra note 79, at 951, quoting from F. MEYERS, OWNERSHIP OF JOBS: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY 3 (1964).
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nizes the significance of work as the vehicle for individual identity,
advancement, and accomplishment, as well as a source of community
economic benefit and security. This notion guarantees employees a
vested right to the continued benefits employment ensures.89
The rise of the doctrines of corporate accountability and social re-
sponsibility also illustrates new limitations on business autonomy. 90
These doctrines subject business to a wide range of constituencies such
as "employees, consumers, suppliers, local communities, taxpayers,
and even future generations." 91 The proposed 1980 Corporate De-
mocracy Act, which would have legislated the final rejection of the
employment-at-will doctrine in favor of "just cause" terminations rep-
resents one example of the reforms that these doctrines envision; the
fact that it received serious consideration evinces the changing
attitudes.
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Finally, the application of many of these principles in collective
bargaining agreements demonstrates their growing acceptance. Re-
cent negotiations between the United Auto Workers (UAW) and the
automotive industry signal an increasing role for unions in enterprise
decision making and an increasing accountability of management to its
workers. Although many agreements include only "effects" bargain-
ing to minimize the impact of plant closings after they are announced,
Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors began in 1982 to guarantee the
unions against plant closings for a limited number of years and to pro-
vide benefits and procedures for layoffs in the contracts. 93 Thus, a
major American industry recognized its obligations to its employees
and voluntarily limited its authority to terminate at will. This reflects
growing acceptance among the nation's corporate leaders of the im-
portance of good industrial relations to productivity and manage-
ment's obligation to act humanely.
The passage of WARN, the Congressional speeches, scholarly dis-
cussion, and UAW talks, however, should not be construed as a com-
plete abandonment of American laissez-faire attitudes or as an
endorsement of the Japanese model. WARN itself is an incremental
step. It does not limit management authority to close plants or layoff
workers; it only requires them to inform workers of that decision. The
Act also severely restricts its scope through its vague statutory lan-
guage and the numerous exceptions which may completely eradicate
any protection that may have been otherwise afforded to workers. Its
own sponsor, Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), reassured the
89. Millspaugh, supra note 60, at 34-35.
90. Id. at 33.
91. Id. at 34.
92. Id.
93. See generally Kovach and Millspaugh, The Plant Closing Issue Arrives at the Bargaining
Table, 4 J. LAB. RES. 367, 370-74 (1983).
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bill's opponents that he intended the law to be "absolutely neutral
with respect to labor law,"' 94 that even he did not expect WARN to
depart from traditional management-labor relationships and policies.
Despite these limitations, the bill did not pass easily: the President
vetoed it and large corporations, those most affected by it, vociferously
opposed its passage.95
CONCLUSION
The Japanese have developed a successful system of labor relations
law, both formal and informal, which has contributed to their rapid
economic growth. Although the Japanese began after World War II
with a largely American-styled legal framework, American legislators
and businessmen cannot duplicate their solutions in response to simi-
lar problems. Japan's plant closing law works well because it con-
forms to unique Japanese customs and social behavior. Applying
essentially the same law in a similar American legal framework will
not necessarily yield the same results, because the institutions and so-
cial norms underlying the laws differ so dramatically.
Studying the Japanese appproach, however, does offer lessons for
Americans not in its specific policies, but in its goals: economic growth
combined with worker protection. The Japanese success in combining
the goal of productivity with a humanitarian approach proves that the
two values need not be mutually exclusive, and may, in fact, be re-
lated. By inspiring loyalty and fostering productivity in employees,
Japanese labor policies benefit both workers and management. Under-
standing that policies which benefit workers need not harm manage-
ment may provide a solid starting point from which Americans can
fruitfully re-evaluate our own labor relations.
94. 134 CONG. REC. S8611 (daily ed. June 27, 1988) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
95. Alexander B. Trowbridge, president of the National Association of Manufacturers, com-
mented that mandatory plant closing legislation "has more to do with election year politics than
it does with helping American workers." BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, supra note 73, at 2. J.
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